Experience
File Analysis
Analysis of file before the Competition Commission and defense in the National Court
The case originated from a sanctioning procedure in which the competition authority was investigating the possible existence of a cartel in an industrial market. The controversy mainly revolved around whether the observed commercial dynamics (especially in prices, discounts, and project awards) were compatible with an environment of free competition, or if, on the contrary, it reflected coordination among operators.
In a first phase, martinsdelima prepared an economic report for its submission to the CNMC, focused on testing (with quantitative evidence) the elements that typically support a cartel accusation. The starting point was the analysis of discount dispersion and its behaviour, with the aim of determining whether the patterns were plausible under competition or whether they could be consistent with an agreement. Likewise, the plausibility of an alleged project allocation and the competitive characteristics of the sector’s players.
At the same time, the report addressed a key aspect in any competition case file: defining the perimeter actually affected, both in terms of turnover and margins, and building a coherent economic interpretation of how commercial terms are set and negotiated in this type of market (including the role of benchmarks, quotations and discounts).
In a second phase, already in court, martinsdelima prepared a specific report for its submission to the Audiencia Nacional, focused on the critical analysis of the Resolution of the procedure. At this stage, the objective was to technically refute and contrast the essential arguments of the Resolution, reviewing whether the economic reasoning was consistent and whether the fine was appropriate or warranted adjustment from an economic-expert standpoint.
In addition, consistent with the analysis of the conduct and its potential effects, the work included a review aimed at identifying the possible overcharge and, where applicable, its potential pass-on to the distribution chain, with the purpose of testing the economic logic of the harm against the case file’s construction and its outcome, always from an expert, verifiable and defensible approach.
With regard to the methodology applied, we follow the steps below:
(i) Competition analysis and cartel plausibility test: assessment of discount dispersion, review of the competitive structure and testing of hypotheses (competition vs. coordination), including the plausibility of project allocation and the analysis of competitors.
(ii) Construction of a “no-conduct” scenario (counterfactual): estimation of a reasonable market price in the absence of the alleged cartel, supported by comparisons and by the relationship between prices, benchmarks and main costs.
(iii) Technical review of the Decision and the sanctioning calculation: assessment of economic consistency, identification of weak/controversial points and evaluation of whether the fine is supported by the economic logic set out.
(iv) Traceability approach: explicit assumptions, reproducible steps and argumentation aimed at ensuring the analysis is auditable by third parties (authority, court and opposing experts).
The differential value of martinsdelima in this matter was to build a defense based on applied economics and evidence, not on generic assertions: we organized the file into verifiable economic questions, quantified what was relevant (prices, discounts, scope, consistency), and transformed a complex case into a clear technical narrative, useful for both the administrative phase (CNMC) as well as for the judicial phase (Audiencia Nacional). The result was a particularly robust and persuasive work: coherent in economic theory, consistent in data, and designed to withstand scrutiny in highly demanding proceedings.