Experiences
Economic Criminal Law
Fraud perpetrated by a bank executive, including hidden transactions and refutation of damages

A family group with multiple companies detected serious inconsistencies in the information received regarding their financial positions and the evolution of their investments. The problem, as described in the report, was framed within a de facto management operation by a manager, with a very broad scope of action over the purchase and sale of assets, which ended up leading to a scheme of concealment and manipulation of the economic reality.
The core of the case was that, to sustain the system’s operation, the manager allegedly concealed losses and, when there were returns in certain accounts, did not communicate them in order to use them as a “compensation mechanism” against losses from other positions. The direct consequence was a continuous distortion of the information provided to the client, supported by the issuance of documentation with apparent results inconsistent with reality.
In addition, the report identifies an especially relevant element in economic criminal law: the existence of a “hidden” bank account, unknown to the account holders, from which transactions were executed without the knowledge or control of the client. Precisely because of this lack of knowledge, the expert analysis considers that the transactions carried out from that account are imputed as damages, as there was no possibility of informed authorization by the account holder.
The operation was not limited to simple charges or withdrawals: movements between accounts, transactions with derivatives, and inflows/outflows both to the account holders themselves and to third parties (other clients) are described, in addition to accessory concepts such as commissions and interest. This reality is key because it allows us to explain why a global or partial approach may fail: part of the “void” in an account may be linked to transfers and cleanups between clients which, if not reconstructed, leave the analysis incomplete.
In contrast to external reports based on aggregate estimates, martinsdelima worked on the technical defense of the case, pointing out critical points: changes in the sample of injured parties that distort proportions, non-individualized global calculations (with explicit recognition of a lack of precision at the individual level), and underestimations for not considering cross-transactions between clients and focusing only on what ends up in the manager’s assets.
martinsdelima’s methodology was based on a forensic and traceable reconstruction:
(i) classification of transactions by type (recognized vs. unrecognized transactions),
(ii) separation between visible account and hidden account, and
(iii) segmentation of inflows/outflows by nature (derivatives, transfers, commissions, etc.) to identify what was authorized and what was not.
In parallel, the required documentary compliance in the contracting of derivatives was reviewed (process, documentation, and logic of suitability/convenience), reinforcing the technical analysis of the complex operation and its risks. The result was a solid, defensible, and understandable expert position, which allowed us to sustain a well-founded quantification and, above all, to dismantle the methodological weaknesses of aggregate approaches: when you get down to the details, you see the transfers, allocations, and circuits that explain the economic reality of the case.